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COMMENTARY
GUEST STATUTES IN CONFLICT OF LAWS:
TWO OPINIONS ON
ARBUTHNOT v. ALLBRIGHTt
BERNARD E. GEGAN*
I have cast this comment on Arbuthnot v. Allbright in the form of
two additional opinions for the Appellate Division. This format has
certain dialectical advantages and is enjoying a vogue in conflict of
laws circles. It is also exhilarating to don judicial robes, however
unilaterally, hypothetically and temporarily. In this case, there is the
additional justification of the abbreviated character of the actual Ap-
pellate Division opinion, which appears immediately below.
HERLIHY, Presiding Justice.
The action is to recover for injuries sustained by an Ontario
guest as the result of the negligence of an Ontario host in the op-
eration of an automobile garaged, licensed and insured in Ontario
during a trip which began and was to end in Ontario. The only
New York relationship to the accident was that it happened in
this State.
The issue is whether the law of New York or the law of On-
tario applies to the action now pending in this State, the defen-
dants having interposed affirmative defenses setting forth the
Ontario guest statute and the common law of Ontario as it applies
to the guest-host relationship. Special Term denied a motion to
dismiss these defenses.
This court in Kell v. Henderson, 26 A.D.2d 595, 270 N.Y.S.2d
552 had the identical issue before it by way of a procedural ques-
tion as to whether or not a defendant belatedly, and in view of
pre-trial procedures, should be allowed to amend the answer by
asserting the affirmative defense of the Ontario guest statute and
while there was some reference to the prevailing law of the State,
the majority of the court decided the issue on the procedural ques-
tion. We have no such question in the present case as the affirma-
tive defense was interposed at the time of the serving of the
answer.
In Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 585, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519, 532
Chief Judge Fuld in a concurring opinion suggested certain prin-
ciples for actions such as this. He stated:
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"When the guest-passenger and the host-driver are domiciled
in the same state, and the car is there registered, the law of that
state should control and determine the standard of care which
the host owes to his guest. * * *
Guidelines of the sort suggested will not always be easy of
application, nor will they furnish guidance to litigants and lower
courts in all cases. They are proffered as a beginning, not as an
end, to the problems of sound and fair adjudication in the
troubled world of the automobile guest statute."
Aside from the pleadings there is a bill of particulars which
shows that the items of special damages were incurred for services
in the Province of Ontario and based upon the present record, the
plaintiff, aside from the fact that the accident happened in New
York State, has failed to establish that he is entitled to the benefits
of New York law.
The order should be affirmed.
TRUEBLUE, Justice (concurring).
While I join in the judgment and opinion of the Court, I add a
few words. In this case we are presented with the reverse of the Bab-
cock v. Jackson facts of a New York driver and passenger involved in
an Ontario accident. 12 N.Y.2d 437, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743. Since both
parties here are Ontario residents and the defendant's automobile is
registered and presumably insured in Ontario, the anti-collusion pur-
pose of the Ontario guest statute is fully pertinent to this case. The
fortuity of the place of the accident does not diminish the strength
of that interest in any degree. With the wisdom and utility of that
policy we have nothing to do. Ontario has the sovereign prerogative
of regulating persons and transactions within the legitimate scope of
her concern as she pleases. Our task is to delineate the scope of that
concern in light of the facts and in relation to relevant New York law
and policy. The question for decision, therefore, is whether the single
fact that New York was the place of injury during the transient pre-
sence of these Ontario residents in the State so implicates New York's
governmental interest in applying its common-law rule of recovery as
to justify disregarding the relevant Ontario statute. I conclude that it
does not.
Since the pertinence of the letter and spirit of the Ontario guest
statute is, as has been stated earlier, beyond dispute, it is in order to
examine the nature and quality of this State's interest in applying
the compensatory policy embodied in the common-law rule of recovery
for negligently inflicted personal injury. While a policy of deterrence
might theoretically have relevance, it may be disregarded as a serious
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factor here. As the Supreme Court of New Hampshire justly observed
in relation to the related issue of the interspousal immunity of a
Massachusetts couple injured in New Hampshire: "Recognition of the
Massachusetts immunity will not render Massachusetts drivers less
careful on our highways since their own and their wives' safety will
still be jeopardized by carelessness on their part." Johnson v. Johnson,
107 N.H. 30, 32, 216 A.2d 781, 783.
The existence and amount of compensation relate to the standard
of living the disabled victim is going to enjoy during his convalescence
or permanently, as the case may be. This factor, together with the
possibilty of public assistance, is primarily the concern of the victim's
home State and only secondarily that of the State of injury. This does
not mean that the State of injury has no concern for applying its com-
pensatory law to the victim; it means only that this concern is secondary
and subordinate to that expressed by the victim's home State. See R.
Weintraub, Conflict of Laws 246.
In response to my dissenting brother's suggestion that we are
discriminating against a plaintiff because of alienage, in violation of
the spirit if not the letter of the interstate privileges and immunities
clause (U.S. Const. Art. IV), it may be said that it is perfectly rational
and humane to deny a nonresident the full measure of local com-
pensatory law when to do so would infringe the legal policy of the
nonresident's own State. If that State has the primary compensatory
interest in his welfare we need not be more Roman than the Romans.
The insurer of the defendant is within the scope of Ontario's anti-
fraud policy and to give effect to New York's secondary compensatory
interest would infringe on the legitimate interest of the very State
which has the primary compensatory concern for the plaintiff. This
we need not and should not do. Accord, Restatement (Second), Conflict
of Laws § 169 (Preliminary Official Draft).
If the defendant had been a New York resident, the case would be
different. It would be no infringement on Ontario's concerns to grant
its resident a recovery greater than that available at home. New York's
residual compensatory interest in the Ontario resident injured here
could then be implemented without embarrassment. Since a New York
defendant and, his insurer would be liable in such a case, I reject the
implication that we are engaging in a jingoistic exercise for the sole
benefit of New York residents. Our task is simply that of accommo-
dating the differing policies of two concerned jurisdictions. Residence
of the parties is material only insofar as it relates to the scope of the
respective governments' concerns and no more.
Although this particular trip began and was to have ended in
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Ontario, the Court does not hold that factor indispensible to the
result reached. I note that in the converse situation of a New York
host and guest involved in an accident in a guest statute State, the
Court of Appeals has held irrelevant the termini of the particular
trip and the place where the guest-host relation was created. Tooker
v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519. Although noting this
analogy we need not decide this issue nor the further question whether
a different result would be called for if the plantiff had incurred
substantial medical or other liabilities in this State.
PUREHEART, Justice (dissenting).
The majority today holds that the victim of negligent injury on
the highways of this State must be denied redress under our law be-
cause the parties are Ontario residents, the trip began and was to have
ended in Ontario and the plaintiff's medical and other liabilities
were not incurred in favor of New York creditors. From this conclusion
I must dissent.
First, there is the controlling authority of Kell v. Henderson,
26 A.D.2d 595, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552, decided by this Court four years
ago, which on indistinguishable facts held the Ontario guest statute
inapplicable. Surely this holding, which has been the subject of aca-
demic critical approval (see Rosenberg and Trautman, Two Views
on Kell v. Henderson, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 459), deserves greater defer-
ence than summary dismissal on a technicality of procedure not men-
tioned by the majority when the case was decided. In analogous cases,
some States have given effect to the relational immunity of the parties'
common domicile (Johnson v. Johnson, 107 N.H. 30, 216 A.2d 781)
while others have insisted on applying the compensatory lex loci
(Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579).
If we must reexamine this matter, it is unfortunate that the
Court mentions that the plaintiff's medical expenses and other spe-
cial damages were incurred in Ontario. Although the significance of
this fact is not discussed, I assume it reflects the view held in some
academic quarters, but never sanctioned by the Courts of this State,
that a State of injury has no more than a marginal "interest" in apply-
ing its compensatory law to a nonresident victim other than as a
fund for local creditors. In a society having pretensions to civilization
such tribalism is appalling. I categorically reject on humanitarian
grounds the suggestion that the protection of our tort law is somehow
the peculiar privilege of New Yorkers. The common-law rule that the
victim of a negligent injury is entitled to be made whole by the tort-
feasor antedates the risk-spreading policy of compulsory insurance and
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expresses a basic view of moral duty and social responsibility. And
so long as society continues to give effect to such views through
territorially organized government, the law of the place of conduct and
injury must be recognized as having a primary concern, or govern-
mental interest, in vindicating its conduct-regulating and compensatory
policies.
A single auto accident in this State may injure two passengers,
one a New Yorker and the other an Ontario resident. To suggest
that the compensatory value set by our law on human suffering is
one iota less applicable to the Ontarioan than the New Yorker is to
take a long step backward into a dark past. Although not technically a
violation of the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV of the
United States Constitution, it violates an even older injunction: "One
law shall be to him that is homeborn, and unto the stranger that
sojourneth among you." Exodus 12:49. I therefore conclude that if
we would allow a New York passenger to recover under the identical
circumstances of this case then we can do no less for Mr. Arbuthnot.
I only note in passing that nothing said here implies disagreement
with cases such as Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519, or
Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31, which recognize a
domicile's continuing concern for its residents traveling outside the
State. A community's concern for the welfare of its members traveling
abroad is not inconsistent with a like concern for all guests within the
community.
Since I approach an examination of this conflict of laws with an
appreciation of the force of this State's compensatory law, I would
pose the question on appeal differently from the majority. Is the On-
tario policy of insulating insurance companies in passenger-host law-
suits of such overmastering weight as to displace the presumptively
applicable local rule of compensation - as applied to New Yorkers
and others injured here?
The first observation to be made on the strength of Ontario's
policy as applied to these facts is that no more than Ontario does New
York sanction collusive claims against insurers. In that basic respect,
the policies of the two jurisdictions do not really conflict. In im-
plementing them, however, this State proceeds on a case-by-case basis,
relying on the trier of the fact to prevent abuses without throwing
the baby of legitimate claims out with the bathwater of sham claims.
Ontario, on the other hand, prefers total prophylaxis. To apply New
York law, therefore, would only partially impair Ontario policy. To
apply Ontario law completely frustrates New York's regulatory and
compensatory goals.
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Disregard of Ontario's guest statute would also give effect to
what might be called Ontario's "latent" policy of compensating neg-
ligently injured accident victims. Although subordinated in its domes-
tic law to the anti-fraud purpose of the guest statute, no one can
deny the existence in Ontario of an underlying, all inclusive rule of
compensation, to which the guest statute makes a narrow exception
for reasons collateral to the primary obligations expressed in the law
of negligence. It is in this light that I respectfully disagree with
Chief Judge Fuld's dictum in Tooker v. Lopez that: "When the
guest-passenger and the host-driver are domiciled in the same state,
and the car is there registered, the law of that state should control
and determine the standard of care which the host owes to his guest."
24 N.Y.2d at 585, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 532 (italics added). The host's
immunity from suit most emphatically does not express a judgment
that care is not due to the safety of the guest. It is not, in other
words, a conduct-regulating rule. It derives from exclusively remedial
considerations-a judgment that the cure would be worse than the
disease. Disregarding the guest statute, therefore, while confessedly
impairing Ontario's anti-fraud policy to a degree has a consolation
from Ontario's point of view in salvaging that "latent" compensatory
goal which had been sacrificed domestically to the purposes of a guest
statute.
Lastly, I note that the defendant and his insurer can claim no
unfair surprise in the application of New York law. When he entered
this State the defendant's expectations could hardly have been shaped
by the possibility of injuring only fellow Canadians.
In summary, I would apply this State's compensatory rule for
the benefit of persons injured here despite the guest statute of the
parties' common domicile. Although not directly raised by the facts
of this case, I add that the same result should follow for all relational
immunities that rest on the anti-collusion rationale.
Although I am convinced that justice in this particular case re-
quires that we strike the guest statute defense, it is not amiss to add
that institutional values of certainty and predictability would be pro-
moted by the rule stated above. If recovery is to turn on factors men-
tioned by the majority, such as where the trip was to begin and end
and the amount of special damages incurred in this state - none of
which, I repeat, has real relevance to either the anti-fraud policy of
Ontario or the compensatory policy of New York - then this area of
law will return to where it was before Kell v. Henderson, a Dickensian
fog of litigation and uncertainty.
